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Introduction
It has been lhe tradition in Europe to develop media technologies at national level
with close cooperation between the state and the private sector, and frequently with
competition between different states and their industrial Infrastructures. The creation of
n ew technologies mostly occurred within lhe electric, and later the electronics industry
and included studio equipment, transmitters and receivers; it also included those
industries supplying equipment to areas such as telecommunications. optics and the
aerospace indus t ry. The state has always provided some of the central players. for
example, Post Office administrations (Telecoms) , research ministries, the military sector
and in particular, the public service broadcasters (Fllchy, 1994: 164ff. 228ft).
During the 1980's a Europeani7-atlon of research and development took place that
was accompanied by quick and wide-ranging changes In the development of media
technologies. This process occurred on several levels:
•

The overall number of broadcasting stations was Increased in Europe with the
utilization of direct satellite trans mission and/or via cable:

•

New techn ologies facilitated European-wide reception of1V;

•

For the first time, new technologies were no longer developed at national level (as it
was the case with earlier innovation s s uch as colour 1V, stereo 1V etc.) but through
supranationa l cooperation between electronic companies, with European financing;
this was especially the case for HD1V and digital radio transmission.

This paper focu ses on three technologies that demonstrate the wide s pectrum of the
new developments; these are Direct Broadcasting Satellites (DBS). High Defmition
Television (HD1V) and Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB). The development of DBS was
largely steered by market forces whereas HD1V had been initiated by the EC/EU1 and
other European institutions such as EUREKA; DAB is being developed with European
s upport in a limited number ofEU countries (Kleinsteuber and Rossmann, 1994: 116f0.

Satellites
Satellite technology started as a resu lt of the technological rivalry between lhe Soviet
Union and the US with a strong emphasis on military a pplications. At the beginning.
Europe was not a serious actor. In 1962. for the first time, the US satellite TELSTAR
tran smitted transatlantic TV images: in 1965 the US began regular satellite
broadcasting. From 1964 until the 1970's, INTELSAT, which was US-con trolled and
which operated worldwide, transmitted to Europe. Europe itself remained passive and
even Canada had launched communication satellites long before the Europeans. During
the 1970's, however, Europe was haunted by the s pectre of the 'American challenge'.
This led a number of countries to boost their policies and spending on media technology
in order to avoid dependency on the US. Initially satellite projects were s till national (1VSAT. TDF) , followed later by European activities, partly at government (EUTELSAT) ,
partly at commercial level (ASTRA) (Jahnson. 1993. Collins. 1992).
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To get away from INTELSAT, European satellite projects, backed at llr:;t lJy U1e
European Space Agency (ESA) began to move forward. Satellite TV started in Europe in
1978 with the orbital test satellite (OTS) of ESA, a low frequency Telecom satellite,
designed to serve cable stations. In 1977, EUTELSAT had been set up by eighteen
Telecom administrations as a European satellHe operator. launching communication
satellites of its own from 1983 (ECS-F-1 and F-2) (Ostergaard, 1986). As early as 1984,
France had put its first national satellite into orbit: this was built by Matra and named
TELECOM 1. Since then French satelUtes have been supplying the former French
colonial tenitories with TV programmes.
At that time, it was thought that European technological self-sufficiency would be
achieved by a completely new satellite specification which was aimed not only at
catching up with the Americans but overtaking them. This was the direct transmission
satellite (DBS) which bypasses cable systems and beams 1V programmes directly into
homes (Direct-to-Home, DTH). It featured a low number of transponders, a national
'footprint' (transmission radius) and high powered signals so that - leaving cable aside a relatively small dish antenna would be needed for reception. The 1977 World
Administrative Radio Conference (WARC) allotted the necessary frequencies. Prototypes
of this line were the German TV-SAT and the French TDF with five channels each.
followed by the British Marco Polo and the Swedish Tele-X.
Let us take the German example. In 1977. several large firms from the German.
electronics and aerospace industry were commissioned to develop the first DBS
specification. The concept of DBS reflected the aim of the then social-liberal government
coalition to minimize the number of new channels In order to safeguard public service
broadcasting, but. at the same time, to demonstrate German 'high tech' competence. In
1981, the Federal Republic and France agreed on coordinated DBS development. The
first satellite TV-SAT 1 was launched in 1988 but, owing to technical defects, was a total
failure. TV-SAT 2. TDF- 1 and TDF-2 went into orbit in 1990 with several channels of
TDF not working. As part of government satellite policy, these satellites were Ued to the
D2-MAC policies of the EC (see below) and thus limited In their Influence. At the end of
1994 TV -SAT ended transmission of TV programmes, demonstrating that this
specification had been developed outside of market considerations and was no longer of
much use.
Because satellite policy was under the direct control of EUTELSAT and the national
Telecoms, competition could only come from outside Europe. A consortium of US origin
entered the field with an American built. hybrid type satellite under the formal charge of
the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg (Noam, 1991: 299 fO. Its special characteristics were a
large number of channels. a pan-European 'footprint' and the potential for DTH
reception. At that time, this advance met with biller resistance from European Telecom
administrations and was only finaJly accepted because the project was set up with
capital from a European consortium. The Societe Europeenne des Satellites (SES).
established In 1985, comprised financial institutions, banking houses and TV producers
from the Federal Republic, Luxemburg, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium and Great Britain
(Ahrens, 1992; Kleinsteuber, 1991).
The first SES satellite, manufactured like all others in the US, was ASTRA 1 A,
launched at the end of 1988 with sixteen and later, eighteen channels. After a test period.
It turned out to be an absolute winner. By November 1994, a total of four satellites bad
been placed in orbit with up to 68 channels. More ASTRA launches are planned for 199596: the first all-digital satellite will start transmission In 1995. Prices for ASTRA antennas
have dropped in recent years and are now as low as ECU 200 or less. According to
ASTRA figures, their satelLites serve approximately fifteen million households throughout
Europe with up to six million in Germany. (There Is a high penetration in East Germany,
because of the lack of cable TV). ln Eastern Europe, too, ASTRA has a large. although
hardly measurable 'shadow' clientele. ASTRA holds approximately ninety per cent of the
DBS market and is thus almost In monopoly position.
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Table 1
PENETRATION OF NEW MEDIA IN WESTERN EUROPE 1993
(SELECJED INDICATORS)

State

TV Household
In millions

Cable
connections
In 1000s

Aus

2.99

967

Cable
penetration
In %

Satellite TV
Receivers
Number

32.30

max500.000

Bel

3.80

3,725

98.00

10.000

OK

2.30

1,323

57.30

65.000

Fin

2.15

780

36.30

15.000

Fra

20.45

1.206

5.90

max 350.000

Ger

min 33.40

13.116

39.30

max 4.200.000

Gre

3.09

min

min

2.000

Ire!

1.00

400

40.00

max50,000

Ita

20.30

min

min

max 100.000

Lux

0.14

117

81.40

1.500

92.00
36.60

max250,000

NL

6.20

Norw

1.05

5.700
642

Port

3.14

10

0.32

100,000

Spa

11.35

749

6.60

150,000

Swe

3.84

1,931

50.30

325,000

Swi

2.47

1.908

77.10

max40.000

UK

22.08

504

2.28

2,662.000

max 160.000

Source: Cable and Satellite. Europe. 1994. 1: 56-65

The first ASTRA channels were leased by the Murdoch group for its Sky project that
later changed into the present British Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB) system, mainly a
package of DBS pay programmes. Meantime. nearly all German and British commercial
programmes are being transmitted via this satellite system and also an increasing
number of publlc 1V offerings (ARD. ZDF, German Third Programmes, 3Sat and others)
(Zimmer. 1993). In fact, ASTRA satellites serve not only the two most profitable
European markets (Germany and Great Britain) Including relevant markets on the
periphery (Austria, parts of Switzerland, Ireland), but have achieved an im mense lead
over its main competitor EUTELSAT (Schmitt-Beck and Dietz, 1993). ASTRA is the
pacemaker in European satellite development and very much ruined the strategies of
the European Telecoms. The German Telecom accepted the new situation: while
remaining part of EUTELSAT. It bought a large share (17 per cent) In ASTRA's SES
company In 1994.
The essential characteristics of the emerging European satellite system are very
much the opposite of what were the declared goals of EC media policy:
•

ASTRA's satellites have been produced in the US and do not support Europe's
space industry;

•

the operator is a private consortium (SES) outside of any effective European regulation:

•

the new DBS transmission norm decided upon by the EC Is 02-MAC. but ASTRA
continues to work in PAL (see below).

ASTRA's success marks a completely new situation in Europe. Until its emergence.
new broadcasting technologies had been decreed 'from the lop', based on an a lliance of
industry, Telecoms and public service broadcasters. With SES though. a different type of
commercial ope.r ator arrived that may choose to ·refuse any politically desired technical
13
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standards, lf it does not suit Its commercial lnterest:s. It dot:s nol seem possible to
Impose regulations on ASTRA, a fact which had been warned against at an early stage
but was Ignored (Taishoff, 1987). The establishment of SES In Luxemburg is only
formal, some programmes for Britain (BSkyB) for example have never been licensed.
EUTELSAT is the only recognizable competitor of ASTRA. It transmits TV
programmes (about forty) on seven satellites, but is. for the most part, a supplier for
cable networks. EUTELSAT employs DBS satellites which operate, however, from a
different orbital position and have no chance against those from ASTRA which has a
market s hare of about ninety percent In Europe. In 1996 EUTELSAT plans to launch
two digital DBS satellites of the HOT BIRD type (EUTELSAT. 1993).

Satellites and digital television
Current plans are for a new type of 'digital television· to be introduced within the next
few years. This will not take the form of an all-digitallzed line of transmission between
studio and screen, but the digital transport of images fed Into conventional (i.e.
analogue) 1V sets. The advantage lies in the fact that via the channels already available
- cable or satellite - a considerable number of programmes (up to ten per channel) can
be transmitted. An ASTRA satellite with eighteen transponders now would then be able
to deliver up to 180 programmes.
It is evident that there is hardly any room for further expansion of advertising on
commercial television In Europe. Further programme services are therefore planned
through subscription 1V, Including pay-per-view; teleshopping channels are also In the
pipe-line. For payment a simple feedback mode is planned which will work as a digital
signal via the telephone network. In order to introduce the new technology in Germany,
the frrms of Bertelsmann and Kirch - which, together with Canal Plus. run PREMIERE.
the only Pay-1V channel on the German market - established a joint venture with the
German Telecom, named Media Service GmbH (MSG) at the beginning of 1994. The
economic power thus brought together by the three largest media actors has been
s harply criticized and the EU banned the project in November 1994.
Other European actors like Burda, Bauer, CLT have continuously attacked this
scheme and started their own planning, based more on terrestrial networks and the
American concept of Interactive television. An international consortium, including
Matra-Hachette, the Pearson group and Burda will introduce Europe Online, modelled
on America Online (run by Meigher Communication, which is also participating} and
offering Interactive services, based on computer transmission.
For a long time, there were no substantial EC/EU policies which reflected these new
developments. Until recently, the EC separated planning and organization for the media
from telecommunication policies. as the different general directorates in charge show.
Since the 1980's the EC has been very active In European telecommunication policies
and has sought harmonization, liberalization and universal access (Steinfield, Bauer
and Caby, 1994; Mansell, 1993). These guidelines bad been Inspired by pan-European
business enterprises with the aim of improving European management communication.
Over the years. the EC bas been active in planning and financing different Initiatives
(KOM, 1994). Nevertheless, national Telecoms and their often conflicting interests In
Europe remain the leading actors. In June 1994 the so-called Bangemann Group
presented a paper calling for an Integrated European broadband network. In order to
connect all telephone, cable and satellite networks via common transmission standards.
In Europe, it now seems to have been realized also that digitalization is leading to a
convergence of communications and media technologies. thus eliminating any
differences between sound and Image. text and data as they all travel via the same
binary signal. The need in Europe for new and efficient networks - as the Maastricht
treaty particularly underlines- is undisputed and certainly part of a strategy of bringing
Europeans closer together. Yet. the logic of networks is always bound up with the
14
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particular interests of different actors and so far the developmen t of media networks has
been mainly stimulated by large national actors with a tendency towards centralistic
and hierarchical structures .
A comparison wi t h the US is evidence for this. The improvement of m edia
'Superhighways' there has usually begun with · terres trial networks being 'scaled up'
digitally and some interactive capabilities being introduced (MediaGruppe, 1994).
lnteractivity as a concept is taken from the logic of computer networks. which work on a
server-client basis (like Internet). The advantage of the concept of interactivity is that
viewers get various options for feedback signals. e.g. for e-mail , access to on-line
databanks. individually selecting electronic newsmagazines or they may even participate
as active senders (Neumann, 1991). Digital communication technologies are interpreted
in the US above all as 'Technologies of Freedom' (Pool. 1983), adding to the media a
completely n ew quality of strengthening the individual. enlarging his range of choices
and offering the chance of becoming personally active and thus less dependent on the
existing media agglomerates.
Comparing these con cepts with the leading pla n s In Europe , a fundamen tal
difference appears. Satellite channels of the ASTRA type are not suited for interactlvity.
they only allow uni-directional communication. This s upports the strategy of the largest
European media companies. like MSG, which prefer a technology that offers 'more of the
same', as such providing more conventional 'IV channels. The situation is quite different
in the US. where the telecom and computer (hardware and software) industries are on
the move to build up the digital and interactive m edia structures of the future in order
to take market share away from the conventional broadcasting industry (mainly the
three large n etworks) (Kleinsteuber. 1994a). As was m entioned, European actors are
choosing the 'American Way· also. as the Europe Online example shows.

New television transmission standards: HDTV
HD1V was developed in a 'high-tech triad' that included Europe. Japan and US. As a
technology. HDTV represen ts the next generation of1V technology which entails at least
a doubling of the number of lines that make up the 1V picture (Kleinsteuber. 1994.
Bischoff. 1993) . TV's history m ay be seen as a s u ccession of stages. each one
characterized by an increase In the number of lines. During past decades. TV screens
were made larger but the density of lines remained the same. Increasing the number of
lines looked like a natural solution (HDTV in Japan 1125 lines. Europe 1250). The
resulting HD1V image can be projected upon a much larger screen: the image is more
detailed and is presented in wide screen format (16:9 ratio). The quality of reproduction .
or so the promoters argu e. parallels that of the cinema.
HD1V with its greater number of lines needs larger channels for signal transmission, at
least as far as the analogue method is concerned (Prentiss. 1993, ZDF. 1991). That is why,
earlier on, HDTV had not been designed for terrestrial broadcasting but only for digital
sateiUte transmission (Japan) or for digital satellites with cable distribution (Europe). Only
the US gave consideration to terrestrial transmission whereby t he original channel
remains and a second independent channel transports the additional HDTV signals.
HD1V. to be sure. conforms to common physical and scien tific laws. Nevertheless,
practical application in the three high-tech region s mentioned above disclosed certain
peculiarities to be allowed for. as for instance the availability of frequ encies in the
electro-magn etic spectrum, geogra phical conditions. population d ensity. Different
traditions and experiences as to government policies concerning technology, industry
and standards have to be taken into consideration as well. Last but not least, the parties
and persons concerned with the development of technical innovations are very different
indeed. Over the years, ch anging coalitions and competition s have appeared in the
'high-tech triad' in the tradition of 'capitalistic rtval.ries' as we know it from other fields of
high tech nology (Hart. 1992).
15
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HDTV experimental work was Initiated in Japan where research in the field of n ew
1V technologies had been going on since the 1960's. As a central actor there emerged
the public-service broadcaster Nippon Hoso Kyoka (NHK) whose laboratories started
a round 1980. and which sought cooperation from interested Japanese private firms
(Nf-IK, 1992; Kenji, 1990). The result was the development of a Japanese 1-IDTV
s pecification. called Hi-Vision/Muse, based mainly on an extension of the conventional
analogue technology. Since 1990, receivers for HDTV have been on the market, but they
are extremely expensive and up to 1994 only about 20,000 have been sold. One HDTV
programme via satellite has been offered on an experimental base for several years.
Durin g the early 1980's, Europe watched the Japanese efforts with growing
scepticism. The electronics indu stry had been confronted with the fact that a large share
of the market for hi-ll equipment was being lost to producers from the Far East. In light
of the Japanese success on the US market for TV sets. It was suspected that the same
would h a ppen to European manufacturers. The European market h ad been protected
because patents for PAL and SECAM were only selectively passed on to Japanese
competitors whose share of the European 1V set market In 1986 was just fourteen per
cent. But gradually these patents were going to expire. The EC started to react when. at
the 1986 CCIR conference. the Japan ese urged the introduction of global HDTV
specifications. based on their HiViston. HDTV was declared a key technology for Europe
that had to be developed independently from Japan. Preconditions for any European
HDTV policies would be incompatibility with Japanese standards and the exclusion of
the Japanese from research (Meyer-Stamer. 1994; Niblock. 1991).
In Europe. too, preliminary studies for new TV technologies had been made, starting
with Great Britain in the late 1970's. The engineering division of the Indep endent
Broadcasting Authority (IBA) developed the system Multiplexed Analogue Components
(MAC) to be applied mainly In DBS satellites as a transmission technology to avoid
colour distortion in TV images. In 1986 the European Broadcasting Union (EBU)
stipulated tha t MAC was to be the new European standard for all future DBS projects.
In the same year. the EC Issued a directive according to which m ember states were
committed to applying MAC exclusively in all DBS satellite transmissions. During the
following years the European Council and the EC repeatedly announced the urgent need
for the Introduction of an all-European HDTV service.
A particularity of the European approach to HDTV was that the introduction was to
be in two stages with compatibility between each. According to these plans, first D2MAC (in Great Britain D-MAC) would be introduced with Improvements in quality of
image and sound , and In wide screen format (16:9), but with conventional den sity.
During the second phase the number of lines would be doubled to 1,250 to provide for
HD-MAC. Both s pecifications were planned to be partly digital, the actual transmission
to continue to be analogue.
Beginning in 1986, HDTV received massive government s ponsorship. Within the
scope of the EUREKA programme, project EU 95 was set up with a capital input of ECU
625 f!!illion for research and development in support of HDTV. The consortium was
h eaded by the two electronic companies Philips of the Netherlands and the French state
controlled corporation Thomson: forty firms from ten countries participated.
A number of other EUREKA projects - BiSchoff in his analysis counts eight - also
related to HDTV (Bischoff 1993: 126). The JESSI programme (EU 125) was to bring
European industry up to world standard in the developmen t of computer chips. To
safeguard HDTV policies. the RACE programme tested glass fibre cables in a 'fibre-tohome' structure to feed HDTV programmes. Parts of the MEDIA scheme for the
advancement of audiovisual production and dis tribution in Europe were made ready for
an early start to HDTV. Europe's filmmakers were encouraged to employ HD1V in film
production. By the end of 1991. more than OM 800 mll1ion had been s pent on the
promotion of MAC via EU 95 (Bischoff. 1993: 153). There was also national HDTV
promotion: i.e. in the Federal Republic. the two ministries respon s ible for research and
telecommunications. had contributed approximately OM 100 million by 1992.
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In the following years. HD1V was styled a prestige European project and the European
Commission gave generous public relations s upport. 'The Commission is helping to
ensure that the Community has an integrated HDTV strategy, involving all the different
industries which must work together for the successful introduction of HDTV services in
the 1990s.' (KOM, 1991). On the initiative of the EC. Interested parties from th e
electronics industry and programme providers came together In 1990 to found 'VIsion
1250' which was to promote the production of HDTV programme material. The Olympic
Games of 1992 in Barcelona were the chosen occasion to demonstrate for the frrst time
the whole range of HDTV technology and to offer HDTV programming to the public.

Nevertheless. the project was ill-fated once the adoption of MAC-generation had been
declared an absolute European necessity in order to end the s plit between PAL and
SECAM standards. In fact. national solu tions were tolerated - Great Britain pushed
through its incompatible variation named D-MAC. The two leading actors Philips and
Thomson, sponsored mainly by their home governments. were both badly prepared and In
economic difficulties; it was argued that EC capital helped to restore them both to health.
But the major handicap was that the transition to MAC had been virtually decreed by
the EC 'from the top'. Those who were supposed to benefit most from HDTV. the
television broadcasters. were hardly interested. Public service broadcasters feared to be
deprived of their accustomed leading position in developing new media technologies, but
they were obliged to face giant Investments despite growing financial problems.
Notwithstanding their legitimate problems and reservations. they were expected to obey
and cooperate on these matters of political concern.
On the other hand. the 1980's in E urope had witnessed the growth of a new
commercial TV industry which maintained an attitude of blunt rejection of HDTV. This
industry had just introduced TV funded by a dvertising at high fmancial risk and did not
want to bother with the uncertainties of new technologies. The president of the
Association of Commercial Television (ACT). Werner Klatten, stated in 1992: "The
procedure of the Commission concerning 02-MAC was typical of the Idea of
harmonization by regulation and Is. thank God . a failure" (European Institute for the
Media. 1992: 18). Moreover. we know from the US example that commercial TV
suppliers prefer an attitude of strong technological conservatism . Accordingly, the
leading commercial satellite company ASTRA and large programme su ppliers like
Murdoch's Sky Television stuck to conventional PAL which became the dominant DBS
norm . Those holding on to 02-MAC such as the users of the German-French DBS
satellites (of the TV-SAT type) or the British commercial DBS project BSB suffered heavy
losses for lack of adequate decoders and significant consumer interest.
The outright rejection of 02-MAC by commercial broadcasters created a difficult
situation for the promoters of HDTV. In a 'Memorandum of Understanding' of August
1990, the German TV suppliers. the electronics industry. Telecom and the Ministry for
Post and Telecommunications were more or less forced to come to an agreement and
support the introduction of MAC.
What looked like a perfectly organized action similar to previou s successful strategies
by the EC was contradicted by the reality that ASTRA and PAL continued to dominate
the market. The appliance industry was quite right in assuming that there was no mass
market in MAC and took time in offering reasonably priced sets. Some programmes were
indeed additionally transmitted In 02-MAC via DBS satellites and Telecom cable, but
this strategy - like the whole concerted action - seemed to be at a dead end. Similar
results have been observed in other European countries. especially in Great Britain and
France (Niblock, 1991: 59ff). In 1991. the first 02-MAC sets produced by Thomson came
on the market at a price of approximately OM 10.000. In 1993 the price dropped to DM
3,000. During the frrst two years, according to information from the manufacturers, ·a
few thousand wide screen sets' had been sold in Germany (Wirtschaftswoche. 20
August. 1993: 60).

17
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The main opponents to the adoption of the MAC specification were. as the example
above shows, the commercial programme-makers and satellite suppliers. Faced with
their delaying tactics, the EC tried to use its authority to force a breakthrough of 02MAC. a policy much associated with the commissioner responsible, Pandolfi. In several
powerful actions the Commission prepared a directive according to which all new
suppliers of satellite programmes would be obliged to transmit in 02-MAC and all large
TV sets would be equipped with D2-MAC decoders. In a 'Memorandum of
Understanding' the EC tried to get all parties concerned to accept this line. The EC
planned a new five year scheme wlth a budget of ECU 850 million to s ubsidize
programme production in wide screen 16:9 format and transmission in 02-MAC. This
impli~d that satellite programmes were to be transmitted in 02-MAC at EC expense: a
parallel service for the audience in PAL ('simulcasting') could remain (KOM. 1992a).
Cable systems were to be provided with D2-MAC as well. From 1991 onwards. Philips,
Thomson and the French Ministry for Research exerted pressure to ban PAL altogether
after 1994.
These EC policies were formed at a time when it had already become clear that 02-MAC
could be nothing more than a transitional standard, and the whole MAC system seemed to
be more and more out of line with developments elsewhere. For the first time opposition
arose in the European Parliament against HD1V policy, mainly from environment and
consumer associations who objected to the amount of money spent on HD1V.
The MAC strategy of the EC as it had been drawn up in 1991/92 collapsed despite
enormous concessions made to 1V broadcasters. The major opponent of the plan had
been Great Britain, an EC country with little domestic electronics industry, but a
relatively large number of Japanese affiliates and also home for mosl commercial
transnational 1V broadcasters in Europe. Britain did however show interest in EC
subsidies for its own industry, mainly for the development of genetic engineering. The
meeUng of the European Council in December 1992 put an end to the MAC-led policy.
In January 1993 Philips announced a complete stop in the production of HD-MAC sets
(Understanding and Outlook, 1993). At the end of 1994, transmission in D2-MAC via
1V-SAT ended in Germany.
In mid 1993 the Telecom ministers of the EC managed to convince Britain to agree to
the following arrangement: during the next four years, ECU 228 million were to be made
available to support programme development for wide screen 1V (16:9). The new EC
commissioner Martin Bangemann, successor to Pandolfi, announced rather vaguely:
'Many exciting new television services - including high definition television - will be
introduced on to the market over the next few years. but the wide screen 16:9 standard
will be common to them all' (quoted in Broadcast. 25 June, 1993). The British consented
because the European subsidiaries of Japanese frrms will be allowed to participate,
which is particularly relevant to Sony.
The .EC policy concealed the fact that other less spectacular efforts were being made
In Europe. The EC had offered its support to a group of mostly large companies and
gave them publicity, whilst small frrms and research Institutions received hardly any
attention. A very small consortium from Scandinavia, though, managed to develop a
digital HD1V specification of its own named HD-Oivine (Digital Video Narrow-band
Emission) for just OM 6 million.
Another new foundation Is the Europea n Launching Group on Digital Video
Broadcast in Europe (ELG/DVB), comprising the EBU (i.e. public-service broadcasters),
European Telecoms and representatives of lhe electronics industry. This group is aiming
to introduce a frrst version of digital television In 1995 (BMPT, 1993:5) with the main
focus, it seems. on digital compression. Here, too, EC money has been made available
for grants in the region of OM 500 million for a programme called Advanced Digital
Television Techniques (ADTT).
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Public service broadcasters in cooperation with the electronics Industry are the
driving force behind a further development of conventional technology which seems to
conform better to the market: PALplus. It carries on the PAL standard in an evolutionary
and compatible way. PALplus transmission will be analogue on 6 Mhz as part of
conventional terrestrial service, but will also o(fer the 16:9 standard for Images with
better quality by a progressive build-up of the 625 lines together with Improved sound.
Developments are being carried on by. among others the German ARD and ZDF. the
British BBC and the Dutch NOB. In 1994 ftlms were first shown on German 1V in
PALplus on ARD, ZDF and the pay-TV channel PREMIERE. Transmission will be
subsidized by approximately OM 450 million under the wide screen programme of the
EU mentioned above.

Digital HDTV in the US and Japan
During the l 980's an understanding prevailed ln the US that, because of a lack of
domestic producers of 'IV technology, an independent HD1V policy was not possible. At
Urnes Japanese or European developments were supported and adaptions to the specific
situation of the US planned (e.g. possibility of terrestrial transmission). Initiatives for
separate American HD1V developments were started in the late 1980's, and, unlike
Europe, were accompanied by a broad public discourse in the academic community and
hearings before different committees of Congress (Prentiss, 1993; CasaBlanca, 1992:
Benson and Fink. 1991). American Investment in HD1V was seen as an instrument of
industrial policy, serving the recovery of key segments of the economy and securing
America's future. There was strong demand for subsidies for HD1V by members of the
Democratic party in Congress (amongst them the then Senator AI Gore). but any active
HD1V policy was refused by the Reagan and Bush Administrations. In consequence,
HDTV development remained on the agenda in the US, but received almost no
gove.r nment support.
In 1987. the FCC (Federal Communication Commission- eds.) began procedures to
clarify the technical and legal aspects of HD1V and Invited applications to present a

HDTV standard by mid 1990. independent institutes were to check the bids and select
the best choice. Japan applied with a version of their H!Vision/Muse and withdrew later.
the Europeans Philips and Thomson joined Ame.r ican companies in a large consortium.
1'wo days before the final deadline a small American high-tech firm announced its bid
for an all-digitalized standard, i.e. a standard based on computer technology.
The resulting tests demonstrated that digital HD1V is going to be the solution of the
future; it offers a simpler, more flexible and more reasonably priced alternative to the
analogue specifications of Europe and Japan. In 1994 a 'grand alliance' was formed of
large US firms together with Phllips and Thomson to develop a final version of digital
HDTV, scheduled to be demonstrated in 1995. American plans are to utilize the
emerging digital 'information superhighway' for HD1V transmission.
In Japan HD1V of the HiVision type has shown very little growth. But any proposals
to stop its spread have been attacked and put down so far. On 25 November,l994 a
regular HiVision programme via satellite was introduced, jointly produced by NHK and
commercial broadcasters. Wide screen 1V of the PALplus type has been introduced in
Japan with much more positive reaction from consumers.

Digital Audio Broadcasting: the technical and economic side
An innovative step in radio technology was developed in the 1980's to counteract a
number of technical deficits in analogue FM transmission:

•

FM transmission Is subject to interference on mobile receivers (cars etc.). In addition.
interference is Increasing on account of the growing density in the range of FM
frequencies and the heavy use of all kinds of electronic appliances.
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•

The FM signal is clearly more efficient tho.n the earlier AM signal, but still cannot
compete with the hi-fi quality of digital signals. ln combination with digital audio
storage already available (e.g. on CO-disc). digital radio would reach 'state-of-the-art'
standard, and be able to compete with home CD recorder.

Digital Satellite Radio (DSR) was first presented to the public at the Berlin
Broadcasting Fair (Internationale FunkaussteiJung, IFA) of 1989. It offers selected radio
programmes of digital quality transmitted either via satellite or cable. DSR is now mainly
used for programmes of classical music from public service broadcasters. and for a
small number of commercial programmes. At present the Hamburg cable system has
sixteen DSR channels. DSR tuner equipment is available at prices from DM 500
upwards". Up to now. though. DSR penetration is only minimal.
Preliminary consideration was given to terrestrial digital transmission in 1980 and
Initial testing started In 1985. mainly at the lnstltut fUr Rundfunktechnik (IRT) in
Munich, a joint subsidiary of the public service broadcasters in Germany. In 1986, for
the first time. the German Ministry of Research and Technology (BMFI1 got Involved In
order to bring together industrial representatives of dif ferent states in a joint European
research and development project. Since 1987. the development of DAB has been
promoted on a large scale within the framework of the EUREKA project EU-147. During
the four years 1987 to 1991, ECU 40 million was invested: for the second phase 1992 to
1994. ECU 35 million have been made available (according to information given by the
EU-14 7 project office).
The Federal Republic has sought the position of initiator and chief promoter of DAB.
A number of German electronic companies. public research institu tions, Telecom and
the IRT are taking part, together with partners from France, the Netherlands and Great
Britain. The German Research Ministry (BMFT) contributed DM 30 million to the first
development phase.
DAB standards were set up "in cooperation with public radio/1V institutions of the
Federal Republic of Germany' and are as follows:
•

A high quality digital transmission mode, capable of lasting for the next fifty years
and with options for multi-channel sound fidelity and data transmission (data radio).

•

Unrestricted mobile, portable and stationary reception: perfect reception to be
ensured for portable sets and in moving cars.

•

A system with high transmission capacity for data channels to allow for broadcasting
of additional information, i.e. traffic information. programme data. radiotext (DABPlatform. 1994).

The initial intention in the Federal Republic was to broadcast UAB on Channel 12
(223-230 Mhz). formerly a channel for military use. Channel 12 could also be used for
DAB in some neighbouring Western European counlries. In Eastern Europe this
channel Is being used by high powered 1V stations which cannot be easily allocated a
different frequency. With a capacity of four frequency blocks with six programmes each.
Channel 12 will not s uffice to convert all current s tations to digital transm ission.
Therefore. and with respect to the Eastern European situation . it is planned to include
1V channels in sector 1 (channels 2-4) as well. The latest plans are to utilize the high
frequency L band that may take eight to nin.e channels and about fifty programmes.
The development of media technology seems to be less an answer to consumer
demand than a response to industrial politics. What counts are new industrial markets
and behind the often publicly stated concern for job creation lies the profit motive. The
German Post Ministry has revealed figures which support this assertion . Their
predictions claim that. since new multi-norm radio sets will be needed, the DAB system
offers European industry a mass market of approximately 600 million radio sets which
require highly sophisticated chips (16M and 64 M technology). To facilitate DAB and FM
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radio during the starting phase, sets will be offered as multi-norm receivers. The
output Is estimated at about DM 500 million.

annu~l

Actors in DAB
Dominant among the organized Interests in DAB are the producers of equipment
relevant for the production, transmission and receiving of digital radio programmes, all
being part of the electronics industry. Another important actor Is the German Telecom,
responsible for a large part of all radio transmitters, yet concerned with little else but
transmission 'hardware·. It Is significant that DAB is being pushed by the Federal
Republic's public service broadcasting system which has a long tradition In pav1ng the
way for new technical specifications In the media field, for Instance stereo radio or Radio
Data Systems (RDS). As far as technology goes, public service radio has traditionally
been open to Innovation and is attempting to continue this policy in the age of dual
competition. This also is in line with their obligation (as stated by the Federal
Constitutional Court) 'to safeguard a basic supply not only with respect to the contents
but also to the distribution of programmes·.
In addition public service broadcasting partly transmits its own programming and
consequently employs technical experts and supports the IRT. which Is central to the
development of DAB. It turns out though that the leadership of the highly dP.c.P.ntralizeci
public service broadcasting organization is split on DAB. some strongly supporting it (for
example, Bavarian Broadcasting, Bavaria also being a centre of the electronics Industry).
others being more reluctant and not participating In the DAB-Platform (see below).
Sceptics argue that DAB experiments exceed the public sector's financial means
whereas commercial competitors might have the use of it later. Indeed. it may well be
lhat public service broadcasters are going to take the technical and financial risks but
be left empty handed when it comes to turning it into profit: partly on account of
insufficient financial means needed for marketing and parUy because politicians might
hinder economic actions.
The competing lobby organization of the commercial broadcasting industry (VPRT)
shows an atutude of watching and waiting. They clearly have reasoned thus: 'the
development of DAB Is of primary importance to industry. European equipment
producers suffer sales losses and need ready markets.' Still in the process of
establishing new commercial radio stations In the country. they s how technological
conservatism and have little enthusiasm for DAB.
So far. only the German music industry. i.e. the producers of COs and the holders of
music copyrights. have openly demonstrated scepticism towards DAB. They argue that
music offered in digital quality v1a DAB to every household keeps the consumer from
buying their ·stored music' on COs and instead supports home recording on Digital
Audio Tape (OAT). They also foresee many conflicts In the field of music copyright with
DAB broadcasters. Their interests seem to go against the Introduction of DAB.
On the political side. the Prime Ministers of the German Lander have the sole
responsibility for broadcasting in Germany. They issued their first statement In March
1993, according to which legislation for DAB and its particularities should clearly
incorporate the existing dual system and must account for different 'Lander-wide'.
regional and local radio stations. All existing stations of the FM band should be offered
the possibility of DAB transmission, and room should be left for future radio stations. As
reasonable as ll sounds. this demand can hardly be met by DAB. as It is technically
bound to blocks of six transmission channels and has only limited frequency space. The
legal and regulatory side of DAB is still unclear. this being a central reason why the
introduction of DAB has been postponed In Germany.
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2. Elngetragener Vcreln
(e. V .) Is a registered
association (eds.)

DAB Platform e.V.2
-rhe German partners actively interested in DAB. formed an a lliance in the form of
the national DAB-Platform e.V. It was established by the Ministry for Research and
Technology (BMFT). The membership of approximately fifty represented public and
commercial radio stations. Telecom. industry and research institutes. Th e board
chairman is Dr. Frank Muller-Romer. a key figure for DAB, who Is based in the public
service Bavarian Broadcasting company (Bayerischer Rundfunk). The Platform's
declared aim is to continue pilot projects of DAB in 1995 and to introduce it publicly a t
the Berlin Broadcasting Fair of 1997.
The Platform is organized into four working groups with respective responsibilities for
(1) testing and field work, (2) network planning. (3) recep tion a nd (4) strategies for
introduction. It is striking that no measures have been instituted to include consumer
interests or even market research.

Special interests of the car industry
The Radio Data System (RDS) currently allows for digitally coded information to be
transmitted inaudibly and parallel to tbe radio programme, identifying the station. In
essence. each digital service is a system for data transmission. Therefore it is possible to
deliver a range of additional information . e.g. to transmit still pictures to accompany
radio news or detailed meteorological maps on small LCD displays. Thus, data radio is
bound to brtng about new commercial applications and legal problems which need
clarification. Important s upport for DAB has come from the car industry which is
interested in this data aspect.
With support from the EU. several projects are on-going to replace the conventional
type of traffic announcements on radio by a data intensive traffic information system
whjch feeds an on-board computer. By supplying current data, it Is intended to give
motorists individual guidance as to by-passes, s lowdowns. obstructions etc. either on a
small screen or as spoken text. Experiments are under way to utilize a Traffic Message
Channel (TMC) with a capacity for approximately sixty messages per minute which will
supply motorists with Individ ual multi-lan guage information (called Pilot '93).
These experiments actually pack digital information into conventional a n a logue
radio transmission.
The TMC method will be adopted and furth er advanced by DAB and will also be
available as a data service to interest groups such as the taxi and rent-a-car business
(DAB-Platform. 1993: 22 fO. This actually means that rad io technology might b e
somehow taken over by the car industry. The TMC developments are competing with
other projects initiated by the same lobby. t:.g. transmitters installed alongside main
roads of highly urbanized regions or traffic guidance via infra-red signals. Obviously. the
employment of these new technologies for traffic control \villlead to. as an advertisement
of the car radio producer Blaupunkt says, 'the Intelligent car on intelligent roads' or,
according to the same advertiSement. 'if we cannot multiply our roads. we should at
least make better use of them'.

European developments
ln Great Britain, the BBC has had a stake in DAB developments from the very start.
A DAB Forum was set up by the different interested bodies and lhe BBC participated in
a steering group (DAB-Platform. 1994: Appendix 10). In addition the Radio Authority.
newly establis hed by the Broadcasting Act of 1990, has called for the introduction of
DAB. In comparison to German DAB promoters. some detailed aspects are given
different importance. For instance the question of a global standard is of much greater
concern and so is t he idea of holding on to parts of the FM and AM band 'for an
unlimited period'. The attitude towards technology In general is more discriminating.
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less deterministic and less built on the notion of automatic technological progress.
Above all. the technical aspect should not be paramount, they have argued.
The European Broadcasting Union (EBU) regards DAB as the next generation of radio
technology and Is mainly concerned with getting necessary frequencies. To this purpose
a World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC) was set up in 1992. The conference
then allotted transmission frequencies for satellite sound broadcasting to different world
regions (DAB-Platform, 1994, Appendix 10; the EBU has also been publishing a DAB
newsletter since 1993).
Strategies to introduce DAB in Europe follow the traditional alliance of publlc actors
(public service suppliers and Telecom) and the hardware producers in the electronics
industry. Commercial radio suppliers are still reluctant If not opposed. The VPRT
comments on this point:
The past taught us that technical innovations succeed on markets
only If consumers realize a distinct a dditional useful effect for
themselves and accept the costs for i t as reason able. Special
emphasise is to be put on the importance of compatibility which, In
the case of DAB versus FM tran s m ission d oes not exist.
Misun derstood pressures of timing must be opposed In view of the
proper relevance of development, Introduction and market
orientation. To start off with transmission norm s for the sake of
industry and competition cannot but end u p in failure. The EC
commission ought to be prevented from interfering by passing 'DAB
regulations' (DAB-Platform. 1994: Appendix 17).
First p ilot projects in DAB have already started in Bavaria (DAB-Platform 1994a). In
1995 more will commence, most of them testing mobile radio reception. Covering all of
Germany with digital audio programming is estimated to cost about OM 500 million
(DAB-Platform, 1994: 13)

Conclusion
This analysis did not cover all aspects of European media technologies. bu t th e
sample should have demonstrated that Europe follows basically two patterns in the
introduction of new technologies. The first one, represen ted by cable and satellite is
steered mainly by market forces and/or national media politics. In the case of cable this
has resulted In an extremely uneven distribution of cable In different parts of the
continent. renecting a high degree of decentralization. If we take satellite. we fi nd that
the market Is dominated by the one company. ASTRA. that established itself as a
commercial enterprise beyond the reach of European regu lation. The result is a
centralized structure. supplying practically all of Europe via a number of DBS satellites.
The introduction of HDTV and DAB follow the old European tradition of 'top-tobottom' policies. A consortium of influential participants got together In order to push
through 'their' technology which is purposely incompatible with all formerly established
specifications. 1t appears that technology is to be accepted as a benevolence rather than
by conviction. Enforcement strategies are mingled with prohibitions and seemingly strict
regulations. For example. starting from a fixed day in the new millennium. DAB is to be
the new exclusive audio technology. Almost one hundred years of radio history will come
to an end: all older receiver sets will be useless.
For HDTV as well as for DAB it seems that th e technology Is given high priority and
is being worked on by a group of interested manufactu rers and organizational users .
Economically this may be defined as an innovation cartel; politically It is a n elitist
European group, seeking mutual agreement. Their scheme for the introduction of new
technologies seems highly non - transparent. Neither in theory nor In reality do
consumers as prospective final users come anywhere into the process of planning. They
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are to be confronted With a ·ready to wear' technology which they are expected to be
enthusiastic about, purely on account of the technical achievement. They have never
been included in the genesis and d esign of the new technologies.
Public discourse about the need for new technologies is clearly avoided. An open
and critical discussion - as took place in the US on HDTV - seems to be considered
neither desirable nor acceptable. There has, of course. been some Information available
on HDTV and DAB, but only in well spaced portions via public relations material,
in sophisticated brochures and at orchestrated public exhibitions. In practise it is
almost impossible to get information about technical problems or about conflicts
amongst those who foster or attempt to block the Introduction of the new technology
(and therefore it is difficult to draw conclusions as to the quality of the technology and
the technical altematlves).
If we analyse available and familiar technologies we come to realiZe that there is not
only 'one' unalterable technical solution for a current problem, but instead different
paths of development can be followed up. (Television with Its regional standards like
PAL. SECAM, D2-MAC etc. is a vivid example). A comparison of the specifications for
HDTV a nd DAB proposed in Europe and the US goes to show that the respective
American version is much more open structured and adjustable than the decision-based
European model. As a solution for digital audio transmission a US consortium is
proposing an 'in-band' technology (or: FM-DAB) that allows for a gradual conversion to
the digital age. The US already demonstrated in the case of HDTV that they can make
better u se of the flexibility of digital technologies than the Europeans. In the end it all
depends on how the market reacts and it seems doubtful if a massive breakthrough in
technology will be appreciated, as is common in Europe. PALplus has to be mentioned
as an exception here.

The funding for HDTV and DAB research came from a variety of public sources:
mostly taxpayer's money, distributed on the national as well as on the European level:
in ·the case of DAB subscription fees for public broadcasting were also used. Is. it
acceptable to use public financial means for a limited purpose such as DAB? The
question must also be raised if this type of HDTV or DAB policy really does serve the
interests of European producers. In any case, the risks of private ownership are borne
by the public, which clearly collides with the deregulatory and liberal rhetoric of present
European politics.
It is not fitting for the outgoing twentieth century to indulge in technology policies
which have been planned almost In conspiracy within an elite circle. 'from top to
bottom'. In the past, too often this did not work well. A more objective and Impartial
approach to technology policies sh ould be based on the following four principles: (1) The
J.utegx-ation of critical expert knowledge in the planning process is highly desirable. to
ask for expert opinion is the absolute minimum. The proposals outlines from the
advocators which are usually much too optimistic should be compared to m ore realistic
and. consequently more pessimistic reports from independent experts. (2) Technology
policies must be made more transparen t: current policies can only be examined if the
fmancial sources are clear, if interested parties act publicly and technical a ltematives
are laid open. (3) Another prerequisite should be an examination of new technologies by
an independent body. At present, inventors and investors are also responsible for final
tests on the ultimate applicability of new technologies. Instead, a public and competitive
testing of new technologies should be required, before technologies are launched and
norms are declared binding. (4) Most technological innovations stem from small
peripheral organizations - companies, research institutions etc. Large actors tend to
think in large-scale terms and attempt to protect their dominant position in
conventional technologies. Therefore they often develop less Innovative technologies.
Particularly in Europe small inventors are often cut off from public funding and support,
partly because they lack bureaucratic experience to reach fmancial 'honey pots'. partly
because they are not taken seriously by large actors and bureaucracies.
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